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Abstract
Energy efficiency has long been hailed as a central pillar in 
climate change mitigation through its role in reducing energy 
demand – not least by eceee. However, some now question 
whether the energy efficiency narrative is sufficient for emis-
sion reduction goals. This is a welcome development, as this 
narrative has often been synonymous with improving technical 
efficiency, while obscuring the question of reducing demand 
for energy services – as opposed to delivering those same ser-
vices more efficiently. Further, it carries an implicit techno-
centric bias, overlooking non-technological solutions. A classic 
example is the EU’s estimates of potentially large energy savings 
that could be achieved by more efficient tumble dryers – a study 
measure which could encourage dryer purchase, significantly 
increasing energy use over hanging clothes to dry. 
This paper draws on conclusions from three research projects 
at the Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand (CIED), in-
cluding one finding that a shift to electric cars risks maintaining 
high travel demand, preventing a deeper transition to a more 
sustainable transport system, and another forecasting signifi-
cantly lower household energy savings from the UK smart me-
ter rollout than previously estimated. I conclude that the energy 
efficiency narrative might lock us in to high energy lifestyles 
through seeking ways to maintain, rather than disrupt, business 
as usual behaviours. I suggest that a complementary energy de-
mand reduction narrative could highlight the limits to (techni-
cal) efficiency savings, and open a way for policy to engage with 
the deeper changes needed to our demand for energy services. 
Introduction 
The Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand (CIED)1, which 
recently concluded its research, was one of the UK’s end use 
energy demand (EUED) centres. CIED engaged in research on 
the transition to a low carbon economy, looking at how a vari-
ety of new technologies, business models and institutions have 
the potential to transform the way we use energy and achieve 
significant reductions in energy demand (and greenhouse gas 
emissions). CIED’s research examined how new, low-energy in-
novations emerge and spread and how this process is shaped 
by market forces, government policy, social interactions and 
cultural norms. 
Not surprisingly, questions of using energy efficiently played 
an important role in this research. Focusing on energy effi-
ciency in order to reduce energy demand is of course welcome. 
However, during my 4 years researching at CIED, I noticed two 
things that lead me to write this paper: first, that the meaning 
of ‘energy efficiency’ as used in a variety of academic papers, 
policy-related documents, and other literature, seemed to be 
elastic and unfixed, sometimes to the point of using ‘energy 
demand’ and ‘energy efficiency’ interchangeably. The second 
was the focus of energy efficiency, which often foregrounded 
technology and technical changes, with less attention to people 
and behaviour, and especially to changes (or lack of change) to 
behaviour and practices. 
This paper aims to contribute to the question Is efficient suf-
ficient? by drawing on three different CIED research projects, 
all of which had a technological innovation as their focus, and 
all centred on the UK. The first (in which I participated) was 
on personal transport, and the roles of electric vehicles and 
1. See http://www.cied.ac.uk.
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car (sharing) clubs in a transition to a low-carbon transport 
system. The second looked at the energy implications of auto-
mated and smart freight mobility, and at governing processes 
of automated mobility transitions, in both freight and personal 
transport. The last was on the UK smart meter rollout and its 
potential to reduce domestic energy demand.
The paper is arranged as follows: the next section gives an 
overview of the research approach, giving a brief overview of 
expectations and visions of the future as used in our research, 
and looking at the energy efficiency discourse and some rel-
evant critiques. This is followed by three sections on the spe-
cific case studies, and then a discussion section with some final 
conclusions.
Research approach
EXPECTATIONS AND VISIONS
While CIED research was multi-method and interdiscipli-
nary, and different from project to project, one recurring 
theme was considering the roles of visions and expectations of 
the future, and how these affect the present in terms of policy, 
perceptions, investments and more. Visions can be seen as 
broadly imagined (usually desirable) futures, while expecta-
tions are more specific details, such as the technologies that 
enable such futures. There is a well-established literature in 
innovation studies examining visions of the future, especially 
around novel science and technology, for their generative 
potential to mobilise action in the present, often through ar-
ticulating expectations of the future. Expectations can give 
real-time representations of future technologies (Borup et al. 
2006), thereby helping to construct and manage the future 
through providing structure and context. These future-ori-
entated discourses can strongly affect technological devel-
opment through affecting current contexts and collectively 
making sense of future technological situations (Konrad et 
al. 2017). Expectations and visions of the future can be used 
to attract financial support for research and development and 
other innovation activities (Fujimura 2003); they can moti-
vate product designers and engineers to initiate projects (van 
Lente 1993); and more broadly raise interest among a wide 
range of stakeholders, increasing legitimacy and uptake of 
novel technologies (Schot and Geels 2008; Geels and Verhees 
2011). Visions and expectations are indeed a key part of the 
process of technological innovation, not an unintended side 
effect (van Lente and Rip 1998; Brown, Rappert, and Webster 
2000; Borup et al. 2006; Hultman 2009). 
It is worth noting that visioning is not neutral, but an inher-
ently political technique. It can be used by powerful actors to 
affect common perceptions of the future, influencing expec-
tations and strategies. Such techniques have their downsides, 
though. Actors associated with a particular innovation might 
strategically inflate expectations or technological promise to 
attract resources and attention, causing hype through over-
optimism, often followed by downscaling of expectations and 
disappointment (Ruef and Markard 2010). In all three of the 
CIED case studies used here, consideration was given to how 
expectations of the future shaped the unfolding of an innova-
tion, but also how expectations were used as a means to ad-
vance an innovation or a broader agenda. 
LIMITS TO THE ENERGY EFFICIENCY NARRATIVE
From a technical perspective, energy efficiency can be defined 
as delivering the same (or equivalent) energy services using less 
energy, or delivering more services using the same amount of 
energy. It is also used more broadly to refer to more efficient 
use of energy resources. Moreover, in the author’s experience, 
energy efficiency is sometimes used indiscriminately in some 
policy and even academic literature to refer to any means of re-
ducing energy demand, from wearing warmer clothes to reduce 
heating demand, to making cities more compact. In some cases, 
demand reduction is assumed to come from energy efficiency 
measures alone, often referring to technical efficiency. For ex-
ample, the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) states 
that “Emissions can be lowered by taking steps to become more 
energy efficient and by switching to low-carbon fuels” (Com-
mittee on Climate Change 2019). The energy efficiency meas-
ures listed by the CCC are mostly technical – from switching 
lightbulbs to insulating homes and office buildings, although 
reducing car journeys is listed alongside purchasing more ef-
ficient vehicles. In other words, transport energy efficiency has 
technological components (efficient vehicles) and behavioural 
and lifestyle components (mobility patterns, shifting transport 
modes) (Grubler et al. 2012).
There is no doubt, as in the above example and many oth-
ers, that energy efficiency and demand for energy services are 
overlapping concepts (e.g., is car sharing a behaviour change or 
improved efficiency?). However, in this paper I argue that be-
yond overlapping, there is a conflation of energy efficiency and 
demand for energy services, which can act to obscure the non-
technical side of energy demand, and thus allows us to avoid 
discussing behaviour, practices and context of energy use. A 
classic example of the technological focus of the energy effi-
ciency narrative is the EU’s estimates of potentially large energy 
savings that could be achieved by more efficient tumble dryers 
(European Commission 2014) – a study measure which could 
encourage dryer purchase, significantly increasing energy use 
over hanging clothes to dry. There is no corresponding calcula-
tion from the commission of the energy potentially saved by 
not using dryers at all. 
The concept, discourse and framing of energy efficiency have 
been critiqued before. If energy efficiency is about delivering 
services using less energy, then energy ‘services’ have to be cap-
tured and standardised (Shove 2018a, 781). This implies an as-
sumption of keeping energy services similar to those we have 
today, of stabilising contemporary standards of comfort, light-
ing and cleanliness, for example (Shove 2018a). In other words, 
“To focus on energy efficiency is to make present ways of life 
non-negotiable. However, transforming present ways of life is 
key to mitigating climate change and decreasing our depend-
ence on fossil fuels” (De Decker 2018). This is evident in the 
UK government’s commitment to drastic emission reductions 
without compromising ‘current standards of living’ – making 
‘efficiency’ the only way forward (Shove 2018a, 785). However, 
this ‘efficiency paradigm’ hides the fact that societal needs and 
demands are not constant, they are evolving and dynamic, they 
are negotiable and cannot be fully predicted (Shove 2018a; 
Shove 2018b). Energy demand of the future can therefore be 
said to be affected by visions and expectations of the future, and 
therefore are at least in part shaped by political and interested 
action of different actors. 
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One of the ways energy efficiency has been critiqued, with 
the need to reduce energy demand beyond technical efficiency, 
is the ‘sufficiency’ narrative, including eceee’s own energy suf-
ficiency project2. One of the project papers defines energy suf-
ficiency as a state in which people’s basic needs for energy services 
are met equitably and ecological limits are respected (Darby and 
Fawcett 2018, 8). Energy sufficiency starts from basic human 
needs, translated into more concrete demands and desires, and 
ultimately into products and services that fulfil them. Sufficien-
cy could require radical new policy approaches, beyond energy 
efficiency policy instruments, as it excludes options which do 
not meet environmental and social sustainability requirements 
(Thomas et al. 2014). Sufficiency research argues that behaviour 
change towards ‘energy-sufficient’ lifestyles can contribute to 
greenhouse emission reductions, and that lifestyle changes can 
and should be included in global scenarios (Samadi et al. 2017). 
It is a more challenging concept than energy sustainability, as 
it questions the ‘sustainable growth’ narrative and highlights 
difficult issues such as separating needs from wants (Darby and 
Fawcett 2018).
Case study 1 – Electric vehicles 
CIED work on electric vehicles (henceforth EVs) looked at 
visions of future personal transport. This work analysed UK 
policy-relevant documents from government and other actors 
in the transport sector, which looked at possible futures, and 
included EVs. Over 40  relevant documents were identified, 
with 20 chosen for in-depth analysis, written by or for govern-
ment, industry, consultancies and transport coalitions. Visions 
of car (sharing) clubs were also considered as a counterpoint to 
the technological innovation. The documents were explored in 
terms of how they portrayed the future of personal transport, 
in terms of visions and expectations, and the dominant narra-
tives and framings (Bergman, Schwanen, and Sovacool 2017; 
Bergman 2017; Bergman 2019).
This work draws largely on the transitions to sustainability 
literature. The UK personal transport can be said to be locked 
into a regime of automobility: a system dominated by privately 
owned cars, reinforced by infrastructure, institutions, vested 
interest, norms and practices (e.g., Schwanen 2015; Urry 2004). 
A significant shift towards sustainable personal mobility there-
fore requires systemic change – a sociotechnical transition. The 
dynamic suggested in the documents is of UK regime actors, 
including incumbent manufacturers, seeing change as inevita-
ble due to sustainability agendas, specifically emission reduc-
tion targets, and gradually introducing lower emission vehicles 
(probably EVs), while attempting to preserve other aspects of 
the automobility system. In transition terms, the regime is re-
orienting its trajectory, attempting to make the EV niche more 
symbiotic in order to limit change (Bergman 2019). 
VISIONS OF THE FUTURE
The work concluded that incumbent actors portray a near con-
sensus future: this ‘central vision’ is of a slow move towards low-
er emission vehicles (probably EVs), with little disruption, and 
crucially, hardly any change to the transport system beyond 
2. See https://www.energysufficiency.org/.
changing vehicles’ powertrains. Visions produced by regime 
actors craft possible futures in a way that makes the continuity 
of the sociotechnical regime more plausible, and this vision is 
strengthened by a convergence towards a single future, imply-
ing a dominant sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff 2015). In 
other words, these visions contain an element of determinism, 
reminiscent of la pensée unique – there is no alternative future. 
Deeper changes to the automobility system, such as reduced 
use of personal vehicles enabled by practice change, such as 
modal shift to public transport or a rise of car clubs, are either 
absent or portrayed as unrealistic or negligible in their effect. 
This is problematic for several reasons. First, it is unrealistic. 
The radical nature of EVs, the largescale uptake of which would 
cause disruption to the system, is not taken into account. A 
study of EVs in Germany (Augenstein 2015) suggests there are 
discrepancies between visions of the future based on sustain-
able electric mobility, and strategies for change rooted in the 
current regime; this innovation cannot simply replace conven-
tional cars one for one without significant change to the role 
of the car in society. The unrealistic lack of disruption in the 
central vision could leave us poorly prepared for the future.
Second, portraying EVs as a techno-fix locks out alternative 
futures, including potentially deeper transitions towards sus-
tainability with lower car dependency. It relies on technologi-
cal progress to meet a narrowly defined sustainability agenda. 
Electric mobility offers a variety of possible futures with ICT 
connectivity that do not rely on current transport patterns or 
car ownership – nor even on what we currently think of as a 
car. This vision is designed around conventional vehicles, and 
so does not play to the strengths of electric mobility. It can 
therefore reduce the efficiency of the system, or even constrain, 
rather than drive, diffusion of EVs and transition dynamics 
more broadly. 
The lack of disruption in envisioned futures is also evident in 
the paucity of scenarios in which emission targets are missed 
or technology fails to deliver on its promises; failure is hardly 
considered, even as a heuristic tool. In other words, the futures 
portrayed are only a subset of plausible futures, constrained by 
a vision matching vested interests of incumbent actors. Overall, 
this central vision is limited and limiting in scope, hindering 
genuine transformation, as the unsavoury parts of the transi-
tion are downplayed, problematised or ignored. It potentially 
prevents a deeper transition towards sustainability by locking 
out alternative futures and limiting EVs to the role of a techno-
fix, rather than explore vast possibilities of electrical mobility.
PEOPLE, USERS, BEHAVIOUR
Another feature of the visions is the simplistic portrayal of peo-
ple, almost exclusively as consumers, users, or (potential) adop-
ters of technology. Other roles for the public, from demonstra-
tors of sustainable lifestyles to political activists, to producers of 
knowledge, to experimenters with new technologies who could 
create new and unforeseen functionalities, are absent. This sim-
ple imagining of the public as passive and undifferentiated ac-
tors whose single role is technology adoption is an inherent 
part of constructing these futures, as other roles complicate 
and potentially undermine the business as usual framing (cf. 
Walker et al. 2010).
Further, consumer behaviour is often portrayed simply as 
consumer choice, primarily in terms of modal choice or even 
2-213-19 BERGMAN
354 ECEEE 2019 SUMMER STUDY
2. WHAT’S NEXT IN ENERGY POLICY?
vehicle purchase choice, with rational actor models and finan-
cial considerations often dominating. Some of the documents 
have future projections which consider only change in type of 
vehicle (e.g., conventional, hybrid, electric), with no change in 
overall car ownership or even travel patterns (distance, number 
of trips, etc.). Behaviour change is seen primarily as choice of 
vehicle powertrain, with other changes portrayed as marginal 
or unlikely. This limits discourse of the role of policy to sup-
port of development of low emission vehicles and their mar-
kets, and maximisation of their uptake. The frustration found 
in some documents at the low uptake of EVs, when the ‘rational 
economic actor’ model suggests they are a good deal for con-
sumers, matches Lakoff ’s (2010) description of how framing an 
issue can limit our understanding.
ENERGY AND EMISSION IMPLICATIONS
The central vision relies on markets and technological innova-
tion in an attempt to limit future disruption. It is therefore a 
good match for the idea of a post-political future, similar to the 
automated vehicles research (see below). This can also be seen 
in the call for ‘technology neutrality’ (Bergman 2017; Berg-
man 2019), i.e., the assumption that with the right supporting 
policies, markets will choose the best options among fuel and 
engine technologies through competition and deliver required 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions with no major changes to 
mobility trajectories. For government, this could be a hesitation 
by the state to back any specific winner in a market econo-
my; this has been observed elsewhere in relation to EVs and 
is particularly likely when the free market paradigm prevails 
(Nykvist and Nilsson 2015). For the industry, this could be a 
delay tactic that preserves the regime’s stability as conventional 
vehicles can meet emission targets in the short term.
This energy efficiency-compatible narrative poses two risks: 
First, it limits energy and emission savings to those that can be 
achieved through the improved efficiency of vehicles, both in 
terms of improved energy efficiency of electric vehicles, and in 
terms of reduced emissions assumed by low carbon electricity 
generation. This ignores, and even prevents, deeper transitions 
to futures with more significant change in terms of reduced 
personal car use, reduced demand and need for travel, and even 
reduced access to mobility, which offer energy and emission 
savings above and beyond electrification of transport. Second, 
this seamless transition to the future appears to be unrealistic 
due to the disruptive nature of electric vehicles; it is a transition 
which does not play to the strengths of electric transport, as it 
mimics a system designed around the internal combustion en-
gine. The lack of engagement with individual behaviour change 
and deeper societal transformation, and desire for a techno-fix, 
both demonstrate the post-political and techno-centric view, 
for which energy efficiency is a good fit, but unpacking the 
drivers of energy demand are not. 
Case study 2 – Automated vehicles
CIED work on automated vehicles (henceforth AVs) looked at 
the energy implications of automated and smart freight mo-
bility, and at governing processes of automated mobility tran-
sitions, in both freight and personal transport (Hopkins and 
Schwanen 2018; Schwanen, Hopkins, and Sovacool 2016). The 
work draws on insights from forty-one qualitative interviews 
with diverse stakeholders from government and industry, en-
trepreneurs and start-up businesses, NGOs and charities, as 
well as a workshop with stakeholders focused on automation 
in freight. It also includes analysis of government policy from 
documents including the UK’s Industrial Strategy green paper 
(HMG 2017), documents from the Department for Transport, 
and more.
GOVERNANCE OF TRANSITION TOWARDS AUTOMATED MOBILITY 
The work on mobility transitions analyses the governance 
of the transition towards automation in mobility in the UK, 
drawing on concepts from transition management, and us-
ing a post-political analytical lens (Hopkins and Schwanen 
2018). The post-political approach used builds on work such 
as Swyngedouw (2010) and Mouffe (2011), in which govern-
ance is reduced to practices and institutions organising hu-
man existence, executed through consensus formation among 
stakeholders, technocratic management and problem-focused 
action, with strong ties to neoliberalism. This governance is 
dominated by efficiency, economic rationality and economic 
administration of markets. It makes private sector participation 
and buy-in essential, while limiting engagement with citizens 
in what could be seen as a democratic deficiency. 
Hopkins and Schwanen see the transition management dis-
course of AVs showing signs of such post-political thinking. 
This discourse can obscure conflicts by highlighting consensus 
and by seeing disagreement as temporary and conflict as eco-
nomic, not political (Kenis, Bono, and Mathijs 2016). It often 
envisions people as consumers, rather than citizens or agents 
of change. The framing is of a global race towards automation, 
which can be won by technological innovation. It privileges 
cutting red tape over public participation. So while a diverse 
range of partners has been involved, the imagination of auto-
mation as a series of technical problems leaves publics mar-
ginalised. People are portrayed primarily as ‘future technology 
adopters’ (Chilvers and Kearnes 2016), although more recently 
‘users’ have been seen as part of the innovation pathway (Hop-
kins and Schwanen 2018). Similarly to findings on EVs (Berg-
man, Schwanen, and Sovacool 2017), a wider range of public 
roles, including citizens, is not envisaged in AV governance and 
experimentation. In sum, “the UK has adopted a reasonably 
comprehensive approach to the governing of automated vehicle 
innovation, but this approach cannot be characterized as suf-
ficiently inclusive, democratic, diverse and open” (Hopkins and 
Schwanen 2018, 1).
The context of the research is the UK government’s Industrial 
Strategy (HMG 2017), post-Brexit referendum. The strategy 
seeks ways to drive up productivity across the UK, highlight-
ing artificial intelligence, robotics and automation as areas of 
strategic importance. The narratives from government see the 
UK as a leader in the unfolding technological revolution. They 
are dominated by market driven, expert focused visions, which 
limit the range of futures imagined – with automation seen as 
a highly desirable and inevitable future, leaving no room for 
failure or scepticism, although these are slowly appearing in the 
media and the broader discourse. 
One of the most important consequences of the narrow fu-
tures and post-political pathways is that environmental bene-
fits, and specifically, emission reductions, of automated vehicles 
is not assured (Schwanen, Hopkins, and Sovacool 2016; Wadud, 
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MacKenzie, and Leiby 2016). This is because the benefits are 
less the consequence of automation itself, and more to do with 
change to operation and design of vehicles themselves and the 
entire transport system. Highly automated vehicles could actu-
ally result in an increase in demand for travel, and therefore 
energy. “Far better transport options – from both an emissions 
standpoint, and an energy efficiency standpoint – are to rely on 
a mix of walking, cycling, and public buses and trains... From 
emissions, energy efficiency, and health standpoints, a mix of 
active and public modes is optimal.” (Schwanen, Hopkins, and 
Sovacool 2016.)
ENERGY SAVINGS FROM CONNECTED AND AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
Various research highlights how energy savings are possible 
through automation of vehicles. Technical energy savings could 
come through more precise adjustment of motion, connected 
or cooperative driving allowing a group of vehicles to move in 
a coordinated matter, by vehicles reducing energy consumption 
of neighbouring vehicles (Vahidi and Sciarretta 2018), as well as 
by enabling advanced technologies (Brown, Gonder, and Repac 
2014). Further energy savings could be achieved through better 
routing that can reduce traffic congestion (Brown, Gonder, and 
Repac 2014). 
However, much of the research acknowledges that AVs could 
also increase travel distances and speeds, and increase transpor-
tation use by currently underserved groups (Brown, Gonder, 
and Repac 2014). It follows that reaping the potential benefits 
of AVs requires the technological development to “be accom-
panied by a social change [whereby] public and sharing will be 
seen as superior to private and individual transport” (Thomo-
poulos and Givoni 2015, 1).
In conclusion, automation, seen as a source of efficiency, does 
not guarantee energy or emissions savings, nor other perceived 
benefits, when users and their behaviour are not taken into ac-
count. Infrastructure, routines and practices from which the 
demand for travel arise must also be considered. The simplistic 
portrayal in some AV narratives of people as potential adopters 
of AV technology echoes the narratives of electric mobility. 
Case study 3 – Smart meter rollout
Smart meters have taken a prominent role in UK government 
discourse around energy demand over the past decade, with 
a complex rollout programme different from other countries. 
The Smart Metering Implementation Programme (SMIP) 
aims to rollout 53 million residential and non-domestic gas 
and electricity meters by 2020, including every household in 
Great Britain3 (GB), with the goal of improving the efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness of energy use and changing consumer 
behaviour. The long planned roll-out is unique in its policy 
design and implementation arrangements (Darby et al. 2015), 
with different consumer engagement approaches planned (and 
to a lesser extent carried out) as the roll-out progresses. The 
rollout is linked to broader visions of a future electricity system 
based on a smart grid. 
3. The rollout covers Great Britain, i.e., England, Scotland and Wales, but not the 
whole of the UK, as Northern Ireland is not included. 
CIED work on smart meters (Sovacool et al. 2017; Hielscher 
and Kivimaa 2018) focused on the expectations and visions of 
SMIP by various actors, including policymakers, businesses, 
third sector and community groups, including how expecta-
tions differ between actors, and how they change over time in 
response to developments. The research used mixed methods, 
including document analysis, interviews and participant ob-
servations. Specifically, smart meter relevant policy documents 
were analysed for the period 2000–2016.
POLICY AND EXPECTATIONS
Smart meters’ place on the policy agenda affects expectations 
of the future – and the future energy system being pursued 
(Hielscher and Kivimaa 2018). Hielscher and Kivimaa show 
how the policy relevance of smart meters in the UK was main-
tained over the period from 2000–2016 through governing as-
sociated expectations and connecting them to shifting energy 
policy goals. Policy documents successfully developed per-
sistent narratives of smart meters, such as empowering con-
sumers, whilst paying less attention to scrutinising how the 
expected benefits for consumers would be met. SMIP is one 
of the UK government’s “largest attempts to date to change 
consumer behaviour” (Hill 2015), implying that achieving the 
government’s aims, and realising the potential for energy sav-
ings and reduced energy bills, depends on the impact smart 
meters have on behaviour. 
In the 00s (2000–2009), smart meters were linked to UK 
policy ambitions to be seen as a leader on addressing climate 
change, as they were expected to enable energy savings and 
therefore emissions reductions. They were tied to ideas of in-
forming consumers with real-time information about energy 
costs, potentially linked to variable time-of-day tariffs. In the 
present decade (2010–2018) smart meters have been linked to 
changing policy goals, for example, tied to a broader expecta-
tion of smart grids. Expectations shifted to be associated with 
developments of new markets and innovations, emphasising 
cost savings over energy savings. Yet details are lacking on how 
consumers will achieve savings beyond being more informed, 
rather “this vision is based on a simple and implausible equa-
tion: if people know about energy, they will use less of it” 
(Shove 2014). 
Part of the lengthy approach was the Smart Meter Early 
Learning Project, which highlighted the complexity of behav-
iour, including stages of household engagement with smart me-
ters and the advantage of voluntary approaches to installation. 
The project ultimately suggested a 3 % ongoing saving of energy 
was realistic based on literature and worldwide trials. Still, the 
early stages of the rollout showed “no general shift in routine 
energy-related behaviours and practices due to the installation 
of smart meters” (Darby et al. 2015, 9). 
At first glance, this in-depth public study offers a contrast 
to the post-political framing of AVs, which suggested cutting 
red tape over public participation. However, a more careful 
look suggests that here too the ‘race to automation’ is central to 
policy. Despite the Early Learning Project trials, the UK gov-
ernment has offered limited explanation as to how and why ex-
pected energy savings will happen, with little attention paid in 
policy documents as to how the smart meter and in-home dis-
plays (IHDs) will (or will not) be used (Hielscher and Kivimaa 
2018). In fact, the policy documents examined “seem to assume 
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a predictable outcome of energy savings” (Hielscher and Kivi-
maa 2018). The efficacy of IHDs has also been questioned (Hill 
2015), as other – less technological – behaviour interventions 
have been shown to be more effective. 
UNCERTAIN BENEFITS
The UK’s energy suppliers (private sector companies) are ex-
pected to benefit from smart meters through reducing costly 
meter-reading visits and increased information about energy 
use. The benefits of smart meters to consumers, on the other 
hand, have been disputed throughout. Hielscher and Kivimaa 
(2018) review how earlier (2000–2005) policy documents 
saw benefits of smart meters as uncertain, later documents 
showed expectations of real-time communication and infor-
mation, linked to an expectation of energy and emission sav-
ings. Expected energy savings (and other benefits) were set 
against costs of the rollout. Meanwhile, the rollout suffered 
repeated delays and the costs were highly disputed (Sovacool 
et al. 2017). 
Recent reviews of SMIP question expected benefits to con-
sumers, and suggest household reduction in energy consump-
tion and energy bills could be considerably less than anticipated 
by government, with energy savings averaging 1–3 %, yielding 
bill reductions as low as £11 a year, as opposed to earlier pro-
jections of 5–15 % (Sovacool et al. 2017; British Infrastructure 
Group 2018). While the numbers have been disputed, there is 
no doubt that the potential for energy (and cost) savings have 
been central to the smart meter narrative.
PORTRAYAL OF PEOPLE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Behaviour was deemed an important part of the smart meter 
rollout, but people were still considered only as consumers or 
users. While earlier engagement aimed to ‘provide and advise’ 
about smart meters, the advice fell by the wayside more re-
cently as deadlines grew closer; centring consumers was not 
accompanied by an appreciation of what such engagement 
entailed. Narratives of empowering consumers are at odds 
with the lack of scrutiny of technological promise and do not 
consider achieving consumer benefits through other means; 
specific technological configurations lead to disregarding al-
ternative futures, a feature of the governance of expectations 
(Hielscher and Kivimaa 2018). Sovacool et al. (2017) go fur-
ther in their critique, accusing SMIP of portraying consum-
ers as rational actors, “rather than an emotional actor who 
may progressively influence what the future energy system 
will look like through a complex and interconnected socio-
technical system” (p. 779).
The pre-assigned role for consumers does not allow for peo-
ple to play other roles. In this the SMIP acts as a major obstacle 
to visions of a decentralised energy system, where people act 
as ‘prosumers’ (Sovacool et al. 2017). Further, the technologi-
cal focus, with private sector requirements fitting the idea of 
a post-political context, mean that “complexity in a liberal-
ized market, with retailer/supplier responsibility for a rollout, 
with control delegated to DCCs [Data and Communications 
Companies], with complicated meter specifications and IHD 
requirements, and extensive consumer engagement require-
ments – has so far negatively shaped the UK smart meter roll-
out” (Sovacool et al. 2017, 779). 
Discussion
This section aims to tie together the three case studies with 
lessons for the energy efficiency discourse. The first part looks 
at the limited portrayal of people and the practical lack of 
engagement with the public. The second part considers how 
these technologies are tied to visions of the future, linking to 
the post-political paradigm. 
BEHAVIOUR, PRACTICES AND IMAGINING PEOPLE
One of the main themes coming out of the case studies is the 
insufficient and inconsistent approach in dominant policy and 
business narratives to the roles of people, behaviour and prac-
tices in reducing energy demand, and specifically to potential 
changes to energy use and how they might be achieved. This 
applies to consulting and learning from the public and to con-
sidering roles beyond consumer/user. 
Portraying people
The case studies demonstrate the inconsistent and overly sim-
plistic portrayal of people in energy narratives, usually seen as 
users or consumers, rather than citizens or agents of change. 
For EVs, the dominant narrative assumes no change to users’ 
travel behaviour, other than buying the ‘right’ vehicle. There 
is therefore a focus on making EVs as similar as possible to 
conventional vehicles, including familiar brands and models. 
By contrast, in the dominant smart meters narrative, energy 
savings rely on significant consumer behaviour change. The 
envisioned reduction in energy demand is based primarily on 
the assumption that provision of information and feedback will 
trigger sustained behaviour change, with little accounting for 
how this will happen. 
This dichotomous representation, as unchanged behaviour 
addressed through technological fixes, or significant behav-
iour change through information provision, has been criti-
cised in the context of smart homes (Goulden et al. 2018). The 
latter approach portrays an informed consumer as rational 
actor, or even unrealistic automaton, perhaps expanding the 
technical efficiency approach to behaviour, i.e., standardis-
ing behavioural performance in the same way appliance per-
formance has been standardised by energy efficiency regu-
lations. This is unrealistic, for example, trials suggest users 
limit themselves to the more basic functions of smart home 
technologies (Tirado Herrero, Nicholls, and Strengers 2018; 
Hargreaves, Wilson, and Hauxwell-Baldwin 2018). The for-
mer approach implies an indifferent consumer that can be 
bypassed through smart technology. For example, Foulds and 
Christensen (2016) found that some of the EU’s Horizon 2020 
funding framework calls for technological provision to bypass 
individuals entirely, despite EU policy putting the consumer 
at the centre of the energy system. This bypassing matches 
Shove’s (2018a) suggestion of ‘purification’ of energy from 
everyday practices into a parallel universe of engineering and 
policy. In this imaginary world, people don’t have to change 
because technology will change the world for us; technology 
is the story’s hero, saving the day (Janda and Topouzi 2015; 
Bergman 2017). Neither of these approaches leaves room for 
an engaged citizen, missing opportunities for energy savings 
through broader changes to practices and demand for energy 
services.
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Engagement
The case studies show limited, and often unsatisfactory, engage-
ment with the public. Given the limited portrayal of people 
discussed above, this is perhaps not surprising. Yet decarbonis-
ing our energy systems, while ensuring sustainable, affordable 
energy supply, has major implications for the public, who will 
be asked to accept new infrastructures, technologies and insti-
tutions. No energy policy or technology receives unequivocal 
public support, and understanding public attitudes is vital. For 
example, ‘undesirable’ energy related attitudes are unlikely to 
change without wider changes to the socio-economic environ-
ment (Whitmarsh et al. 2011). 
Practices 
The importance of looking at practices of everyday life was high-
lighted by Shove (2015) in the context of smart meters: “if we see 
energy as being embedded in a huge variety of different practices 
– that is, if we think of energy as something that is in a sense part 
of writing emails, watching TV, or making dinner – then demand 
reduction is not about energy as such, it is about changing the 
details of daily life”. Framed in terms of practices, the EV ‘central 
vision’ sees an (arguably unrealistic) lack of change to practices 
through a future technological shift in car powertrains, despite 
the shift requiring infrastructural and institutional changes, and 
even changes to driving practices. The smart meter visions im-
ply potential changes to practices, although these are unspecified 
and unproven. The AV research highlights how changes to the 
transport system, including practices beyond car use and extend-
ing to cycling, walking and public transport use, are the key to 
energy savings and other benefits. This disparate approach to 
practices is better understood in the context of visions compet-
ing to shape the future, as discussed below. 
TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE
Fight for the future
Different visions and narratives can be seen as a fight to shape 
the future. Shove (2018a; 2018b) reminds us that the energy 
efficiency narrative presumes certain practices and energy 
services, usually similar to current lifestyles, and that future 
demand is not predetermined and cannot be fully predicted. 
I would add that the use of visions, and the expectations they 
generate, presumes to do exactly that – assume future energy-
related behaviours and practices, despite these being unknow-
able, and act to shape the future to suit these visions. 
For example, EVs are pushed by the UK government’s agenda 
to reduce emissions. The expectations and future narratives have 
been tempered by powerful incumbent actors in the transport 
sector, in order to minimise disruption and focus on substitution 
of EVs for conventional vehicles, leading to a focus on energy 
efficiency of the vehicle. This matches the idea that “discourses 
of energy efficiency are politically convenient precisely because 
they play a political role in sustaining current interpretations of 
energy services and ‘needs’” (Shove 2018b). However, more ef-
ficient cars and continued automobility offer limited energy sav-
ings. Further, this focus on continuity could ultimately be self-
defeating: the focus on equilibrium and adoption of technology 
is in contrast to the history of disequilibrium in energy transitions 
and technological revolutions, as “the transformation is so far-
reaching that the ultimate future state of the system could have 
never been reached by incremental improvements in efficiency 
and costs of existing technologies and energy services” (Grubler 
et al. 2012, 111).
Technology and the smart agenda
The case studies show evidence of policy level reluctance to ac-
tively engage in social change and behaviour change, preferring 
to focus on efficiency, primarily through technology. Even when 
behaviour change is addressed, it is often through information 
supplied via technology, ‘enabling’ emission reductions. Foulds 
and Christensen (2016) similarly demonstrate how techno-
economic thinking dominates energy efficiency-related funding 
in the Horizon 2020 funding framework, which focuses on de-
veloping technologies and overcoming barriers to technological 
provision. This approach matches the ideas of ‘purification’ of 
energy use and technology as hero discussed above. However, it 
is hard to see how this technological focus can address some of 
the larger energy and emission demand challenges, from long-
distance flights to buying numerous consumer goods. 
All three case studies are tied to the ‘smart’ agenda, a vision 
of the future in which interconnected vehicles, appliances and 
gadgets automate life efficiently, providing for all our needs 
while reducing our energy use. This is in line with the gov-
ernment’s emphasis on the UK’s central role in the unfolding 
technological revolution, and its economic promise. However, 
the energy savings (and other predicted benefits) of the smart 
energy future have been contested. For example, a review of 
indirect energy effects of ICT (Horner, Shehabi, and Azevedo 
2016) suggests that while the technical potential of net energy 
savings from ICT is ‘likely positive’, the magnitude and even 
sign of real savings is unclear and difficult to assess, depend-
ing on user interaction and broader societal impacts. Similarly, 
recent literature on smart homes highlights the need to better 
understand how households use smart technologies in prac-
tice (Hargreaves, Wilson, and Hauxwell-Baldwin 2018; Gram-
Hanssen and Darby 2018).
Post-politics
I suggest the focus on technology is strongly tied not only to 
a neoliberal agenda, but more broadly to a post-political para-
digm. This can be seen first, in the framing of sustainability 
narrowly as the need for energy and emissions reductions, i.e., 
a series of technological problems which can be solved through 
innovation and spread by markets. Second, the idea of high-
lighting consensus and seeing conflict as economic, not politi-
cal, applies clearly in the EV study, where the focus of future 
visions was on how fast new vehicle technologies would come 
into play, and which low-carbon technology might ‘win’, side-
lining discussions of broader changes to the transport system, 
mobility needs, behaviour change, and questioning the right 
to high-demand travel. This applies to smart meters too – the 
insistence on the rollout, with the idea of gains in efficiency 
and fuzzily defined benefits to consumers erases other possi-
ble futures by creating the expectation that smart meters are 
inevitable. Third, the privileging of private sector involvement, 
and the focus on economic rationality and markets over deeper 
engagement with people, has been demonstrated in all three 
case studies. Energy efficiency fits well into the post-political 
paradigm, especially when focused on technology, while social 
change to reduce energy demand does not. 
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Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the limits to the energy efficiency nar-
rative. While more efficient use of energy, through improved 
technology or other more efficient provision of energy services, 
clearly contributes to energy and greenhouse gas emission re-
duction, I conclude that the energy efficiency narrative on its 
own is limited and limiting. As demonstrated through three 
CIED case studies, the focus on energy efficiency, primarily 
through technology, limits discourse to energy practices similar 
to the ones we currently experience, potentially locking us in to 
high energy lifestyles through seeking ways to maintain, rather 
than disrupt, current practices and business as usual behaviours. 
It is no coincidence that the energy efficiency discourse con-
flates efficiency with demand reduction. The techno-economic 
focus, especially under post-political thinking, portrays effi-
ciency as the only way forward as both market-driven econom-
ic growth and current lifestyles are sacrosanct. Furthermore, 
as the transitions approach highlights, maintaining current 
practices is in the interest of incumbent actors, who use vi-
sions, among other tools, to portray a single possible future. 
Other changes to energy demand, through altering practices 
and questioning social norms on how and why energy is used, 
are politically marginalised. 
I suggest that achieving the significant energy and emissions 
savings needed for fighting climate change requires a renewed 
emphasis on the non-technical drivers of energy demand. 
Complementing the energy efficiency narrative with an energy 
demand reduction narrative, which questions current energy 
use patterns and considers long-term practice changes, could 
highlight the limits to (technical) efficiency savings, and open 
a way for policy to engage with the deeper changes needed to 
our demand for energy services. The energy sufficiency work 
can already contribute to this narrative. Is efficient sufficient? 
My answer is no. 
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